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 On December 31, 1861, after some twenty years as ruler, Pedro II, Emperor of Brazil, 
began a new diary.  The opening entry, an exercise in self-explanation, contained the passage: “I 
have sworn the Constitution and, even if I had not sworn it, it would be for me a second 
religion”.2  This quotation by Pedro II goes far to explain why I entitled this presentation “The 
Enigma of Liberalism in Imperial Brazil, 1822-1889”.  This talk has four parts.  It first considers 
those attributes of the ideology of Liberalism which constituted its greatest strengths and its 
principal weaknesses.  The second part discusses, in the context of those aspects, the rise of 
Liberalism in Brazil.  It analyzes, thirdly, the complex relationship of Liberalism and Monarchy 
in Brazil during the thirty years after Pedro II’s majority in 1840 and, finally, it identifies the 
factors that caused the parallel decline and fall of Liberalism and Monarchy from 1870 to 1889. 
 The North American saying, “you can’t nail Jell-O – that is jelly – to the wall”, seems 
appropriate to any attempt to analyze Liberalism of the nineteenth century, the protean nature of 
which gave it a very diverse appeal and meaning.  Despite these obstacles, I want to suggest that 
                                                 
1
  I would like to thank Dr. Deborah Toner for inviting me to give a presentation on February 10, 
2012 as part of the ISA series on “Liberalism in the Americas”.  I am grateful for the questions 
and comments made following the presentation which have enabled me to fine tune the text. 
2  Entry for December 31, 1861 in H. Vianna, ed., “Diário de 1862,” Anuário do Museu Imperial 
xvii (1955): 15. 
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three key elements existed in Liberalism, no matter what its transmutations.  The three are, first, 
the Constitution, both in and of itself and for its broader significance; second, the nation state, 
and third, the citizen. 
 As Pedro II’s diary entry reveals, the Constitution was for Liberals the keystone to their 
belief system.  To function properly a country had to possess a constitution and, when Liberals 
gained power wherever they did so, the election of a constituent assembly was the first priority.  
A constitution, once promulgated, served as a talisman.  It would of itself right all wrongs, 
prevent abuses of power and protect established rights.  Liberals revered it, treated it as sacred.  
It was the ark of their covenant.  It was not just Pedro II who viewed the constitution as his 
“second religion”. 
 At the same time the constitution possessed a larger significance.  It embodied 
Liberalism’s concern for what may be termed “right process”: all relationships within the public 
sphere had to be conducted in accord with established rules and given procedures.  Those rules 
and procedures had to be rational, deriving from first principles. 
 In other words, Liberalism was concerned with the world as it ideally should be and not 
with the world as it was with all its imperfections and contradictions.  The appeal and the power 
of this vision should not be underestimated.  It inspired a host of influential books and tracts.  In 
the hostile world of the early nineteenth century the vision generated the revolutions in Europe of 
1820, 1830 and 1848 and more arguably the independence movements in Latin America.  On the 
other side, the evident weakness of Liberalism lay in the fact that the constitution existed only in 
and as print.  It had nothing to do with the lived, non-literate experience in which most people 
then existed.   Without the capacity to read and a command of the culture generated by the 
printed word or what is now termed “text”, it was not possible to understand and so to obey the 
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constitution.  It is important to realize that Liberalism by its very nature was an arcane, alien 
system for the many people who did not meet its criteria. 
 The second key aspect of Liberalism lay in its identification with the nation state.  
Liberals viewed the nation-state as a natural entity, uniting as it did every one sharing the same 
language, ethnicity and culture, and as the norm for political organization.  A constitution 
demarcated the nation-state’s frontiers, established its language and dealt with religion and 
education. Liberalism contributed powerfully to the creation of Belgium as part of the 1830 
revolution and of Romania as part of that of 1848.  Far more importantly for our purposes was 
the role of Liberalism in the establishment of the nation-states of Latin America.  Where long-
standing symbols of identity and loyalty were lacking, Liberalism could and did supply them, as 
happened in Belgium in 1830 and in Romania in 1848.  Since these symbols, such a national flag 
and national anthem, were, in contrast to the constitution, visual and lived, the nation-state 
attracted far more support and commitment than Liberalism could do by itself.  The drawback to 
this identification of Liberalism with the nation-state was that any groups within the country who 
did not conform to the designated language or ethnicity could be subjected to discrimination, 
sometimes amounting to persecution.  Xenophobia, particularly when directed against perceived 
enemies (such as the former colonial power) could lead to internal conflicts and external wars. 
 The third key aspect of Liberalism was the citizen, who stood at the centre of society as 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of August 26, 1789 attested.  For 
Liberals absolute equality had to exist between citizens, eliminating all inherited privilege and 
distinctions by birth.  The political order in general and the national government in particular 
existed for the protection and benefit of the citizen just as citizens as a whole assured the security 
and the prosperity of the nation-state.  The citizen, as Liberalism defined that being, was the 
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literate, cultured, politically conscious and active male, gainfully employed and owning property.  
Liberals believed that any male could by force of determination, self-instruction, and industry 
achieve these qualities.  Any man who did possess them could aspire to occupy the highest posts 
in the government of the country.  The concept of the citizen gave autonomy to and legitimized 
the aspirations of ordinary men, particularly those skilled in commerce or letters.  Liberalism 
thus attracted the support of those who sought a political status equivalent to that they enjoyed in 
the social, economic and cultural spheres.  The emphasis that Liberalism placed on the absolute 
right to property, protecting the citizen from confiscation or uncompensated expropriation by the 
government, appealed strongly to the newly wealthy. 
 The weakness of this focus on the citizen was that it excluded as much as it included.  
Women were relegated to the private sphere.  Men who were illiterate, poor or disadvantaged 
were not just excluded but were held responsible for their own condition due to their lack of 
initiative and self-help.  Liberalism denied to such men the right to vote and therefore any voice 
in the political community.  The distinction between active and passive citizens, introduced in 
the French Constitution of 1791 and widely adopted elsewhere, meant that only well-to-do males 
were involved in the actual electoral process.  Liberalism can be said to have been as much elitist 
as it was egalitarian.  To make the same point in another way, there existed in Liberalism a 
tension, almost a contradiction between a commitment to equality and individual autonomy and 
an insistence on social stability, indispensable for the protection of property rights.  Social 
stability could not exist if a strong political order did not. 
 It is in this context that the relationship between Liberalism and Monarchy should be 
considered.  For many, perhaps most adepts of Liberalism, a republic was the ideal form of 
government, to be adopted either immediately or at some future moment.  On the other hand a 
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considerable minority of Liberals viewed the monarchy as the necessary keystone for a secure 
political order that alone could guarantee social stability.  Several European monarchies 
possessed constitutions – Norway and France in 1814, the Netherlands in 1815, Baden in 1818, 
and Belgium in 1831.  The Norwegian and Belgium monarchical constitutions, admittedly much 
amended, endure to this day.  During much of the nineteenth century therefore Monarchical 
Liberalism was not and should not be viewed as exceptional.  Imperial Brazil existed within this 
context rather than being an oddity as compared to the natural and inevitable Republicanism of 
Spanish America. 
 I now turn to the second part of this presentation, which analyzes the rise and triumph of 
Liberalism in Brazil in the years before 1840.  The social, cultural and economic conditions 
existing at the start of the nineteenth century in the territories now constituting Brazil were, it can 
be argued, entirely unfavourable to the establishment of Liberalism there.  Nineteen separate 
colonies then existed in Portuguese America, functioning largely in isolation from each other, in 
good part due to the difficulty of communication between them by land or sea.  The colonies had 
the sole purpose of supplying precious metals and raw materials to Portugal.  They could trade 
only with Africa and Portugal.  Slaves, imported from Africa, supplied the necessary labour, so 
much so that they constituted the majority of the inhabitants in Portuguese America.  No printing 
press was allowed.  The educational system was minimal so that literacy was unusual.  No 
autonomous institutions, save for the town councils and the Catholic Church, were permitted.  In 
sum there existed no autonomy and no sense of a public sphere. 
 These conditions made it unlikely that an independent nation-state would come into 
existence.  If it did, it would more likely be monarchical than Liberal.  During the late colonial 
period, there existed no sense of separate identity, of potential nationhood, encompassing the 
6 
 
entirety of the territories now known as Brazil.  What then prevailed in Portugal and in its 
overseas possessions was not nationalism as we understand the term but rather a binary 
identification with and loyalty to the monarch and the pátria.  While the term “monarch” needs 
no explanation, the pátria does.  In brief, the pátria was the individual’s “native land”, the 
physical locale into which an individual was born, grew up, was familiar with, usually worked 
in, procreated in and would die in.  Loyalty to and identity with the monarch and the pátria were 
interwoven and virtually inseparable.  The concept of the pátria was not incompatible with that 
of the nation as Liberalism defined that term but it could not, in the early nineteenth century, 
exist alone, separate from the monarch. 
The Napoleonic invasion of Portugal and then Spain in 1807 had totally different 
consequences in respect to the two countries’ New World colonies.  Rather than submit to 
Napoleon, as did the Spanish Crown, the royal family and government in Portugal fled across the 
Atlantic to Rio de Janeiro and there re-established itself, basically a replica of what existed in 
Lisbon.  Brazil’s ports were opened to all foreign trade, the printing press was introduced, and 
later two medical colleges and a military school were founded.  The consequence was the 
establishment over a period of fourteen years, from 1808 to 1821, of the institutions of a national 
government, a development that was both recognized and legitimized when in 1816 Brazil was 
raised to the status of a kingdom, equal and united to that of Portugal.  By then Rio de Janeiro 
had become in effect the capital of the Portuguese world. 
 It was during these fourteen years that Liberalism became established as the predominant 
if illicit ideology in Brazil.  The opening of the ports in 1808 gave entry to foreigners – 
merchants, artisans, artists and others – and to books and periodicals in various languages.  
Equally important as a vehicle for the spread of Liberal ideas was the founding of Masonic 
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lodges in the port cities.  The creation of the kingdom of Brazil along with the apparatus of a 
state fostered the emergence of a sense of common identity and a rejection of colonial status.  
The inefficiencies of the royal government, the fiscal demands it made, the economic slump in 
the late 1810s and the oppressive rule in the localities generated discontent.  In March 1817 a 
revolt, inspired by Liberal ideas, broke out in the port city of Recife and for a few weeks a 
Republican regime existed in the Northeast of Brazil. 
 Two major social elements supported this revolt.  First were the local plantation owners 
and major landowners.  They found in the tenets of Liberalism, particularly its emphasis on 
representative government, on the citizen and on the rights of property, justification and so 
legitimization of their dominance of the local scene and their ownership of slaves.  The second 
were minor bureaucrats, junior clergymen, skilled artisans, merchants’ clerks and the like, all of 
whom were literate, politically conscious and often of mixed racial descent.  Liberalism appealed 
to them because it offered an independent state founded on the premise of equality between 
citizens with open access to all government positions.  What made the 1817 revolt distinctive 
was that it based itself solely on the pátria, rejecting both monarch and rule by Rio de Janeiro.  
This narrow appeal explains in part why the uprising failed.  The royal government was able to 
re-establish its rule, but with shaken legitimacy. 
 What did disrupt the status quo based on rule by Rio de Janeiro was a further rising in 
April 1820, this time in Portugal.  There army units successfully demanded the election of a 
constituent assembly and the return of the king to Lisbon.  The immediate reaction in Brazil to 
this new Liberal order in Portugal was entirely favourable.  It was this same Liberal order that 
would be principally responsible for the breach between Portugal and its former colonies in the 
New World and for the emergence of Brazil as a nation state. 
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 For Liberals, as I have stressed, a constituent assembly was the embodiment of the people 
and so of the nation.  The assembly’s authority was absolute: it alone spoke and decided for the 
nation.  Any challenge to its decisions was unacceptable and, worse yet, insulting to the 
assembly members.  The assembly that was elected, known as the Lisbon Cortes, conformed 
exactly to this model.  Confident in their own righteousness the Cortes deputies embarked on the 
task of reshaping the Portuguese possessions to conform to the Liberal model – a single national 
government with no intervening authority between it and the people.  By the time the first 
deputies from Brazil took their seats, the Cortes was fully engaged in abolishing all the 
institutions created in Brazil since 1808.  By depriving Rio de Janeiro of its status as a capital 
these measures understandably caused open defiance which in turn made the Cortes all the more 
determined to assert its supremacy. 
 The opposition in Brazil to the Cortes and its actions was in essence conservative, 
determined to preserve the status quo created since 1808, but the case was presented in the 
language of Liberalism: Brazil was by natural right an independent nation-state with its own 
culture and with a government based on the people.  The appeal to Liberalism both legitimized 
the opposition and mobilized popular support, particularly among the minor bureaucrats, junior 
clergymen, skilled artisans, merchants’ clerks and the like.  For this group independence as a 
new nation-state signified more than self-government, it meant a purging of the colonial heritage 
and the ousting of those born in Portugal. 
 The circumstances of the time meant that little disagreement existed as to the form an 
independent government should take.  When the king of Portugal returned to Lisbon in May 
1821, he left his elder son and heir, Prince Pedro, behind in Rio de Janeiro, to serve as regent of 
the Kingdom of Brazil.  It was the young Prince Regent’s decision in January 1822 to defy the 
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Cortes’ order to return to Europe that sparked and given viability to the struggle for 
independence.  For Brazilians of traditional views, and they were numerous, the Prince Regent 
embodied legitimate authority, given that they viewed his father as being the Cortes’ captive.  
Those of Liberal outlook realized that the Prince was indispensable to the success of the rising 
against Portugal. Accepting the theoretical superiority of a republic, they remembered the fiasco 
of the 1817 rising.  Only the presence of a monarch could ensure that the very diverse 
geographical areas making up Brazil continued united as a single nation state.  On the other 
hand, the adepts of Liberalism did not perceive the future monarch of Brazil as being, once 
independence was secured, other than a figurehead with power residing in a government 
representative of the people. 
 The supporters of Liberalism acted as the shock troops of the Independence movement, 
constantly pushing for a total break with Portugal.  They first secured the calling of a separate 
constituent assembly for Brazil and then achieved a formal declaration of independence with the 
prince being proclaimed Emperor Pedro I.  There was a momentary setback for the Liberals in 
October 1822 when they attempted to make the town councils’ recognition of Pedro I as 
Emperor conditional on his accepting the constitution that the forthcoming assembly would 
produce.  The conservative elements controlling the new government used this manoeuvre to 
disrupt by arrests and exile abroad the existing Liberal leadership. 
 The appeal and resilience possessed by Liberalism can be measured by the ability of its 
adepts to overcome this setback.  When the new Constituent Assembly convened in May 1823, 
deputies identifying with the Liberal cause took control of its proceedings.  The Assembly’s 
debates which were recorded and published give a clear picture of the dominant currents of 
Liberal thought prevailing in Brazil in the era of independence.  The first, which may be termed 
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mainstream Liberalism, was supported by those who held university degrees, made their careers 
in the royal service and occupied secure social positions.  They espoused a constitutional 
government, dominated by an elected assembly, assuring the rights of citizens whom they 
equated with men like themselves.  They identified, above all else, with the new nation-state of 
Brazil.  The second current, less numerous, was composed of men who had had to make their 
way in the world, often priests or those with little formal education.  For them equality, 
regardless of origin, social or racial, was important.  They detested the Portuguese born whom 
they identified as the agents of colonialism and absolutism.   The Nativists, as they may be 
termed, identified with their own pátria¸ believing that it should be largely autonomous.  The 
national government’s role, as they saw it, was to guarantee social order and prevent foreign 
aggression. 
 The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly were compounded of prolixity, lack of 
focus, endless meddling in peripheral matters and aggressive self-righteousness.  Of the major 
issues that were debated two are significant for our purposes.  The first concerned the 
distribution of power between the central government and the localities in the new nation-state.  
At independence elected juntas replaced in the provinces the captains general who had wielded 
absolute power during the colonial period.  The performance of the juntas proved so incompetent 
as to necessitate their replacement.  Moreover, their very existence contradicted the mainstream 
Liberal belief that no institution should intervene between the national government and the 
citizens.  Despite strenuous opposition by the Nativist minority, the Assembly passed a law, one 
of the few it did enact, creating the post of provincial president, an official appointed and 
removable at will by the national government. 
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 The second issue debated concerned the distribution of power between the assembly and 
the monarch.  The deputies lost no opportunity to claim that the Emperor did not hold any 
independent authority from the people and that he was subordinate to the Assembly and its 
decisions.  The opponents of this stance, while not numerous, did not reject Liberalism as such 
but drew on the writings of two sages, the Abbé Sieyès and Benjamin Constant de Rebecque, to 
urge a very different concept of the political order.  These deputies postulated the existence of a 
fourth power, in addition to the executive, legislative and judicial.  What they termed the 
“regulating power” gave control of key aspects of the constitution to the monarch who could thus 
both assure the smooth functioning of the political system and guard the supreme interests of the 
nation.  Napoleon Bonaparte had used this concept along with that of the providential man to 
legitimize his rule.  The Napoleonic system still exerted a considerable appeal.   For all the faults 
of his regime, Napoleon had made real several of Liberalism’s goals, above all the Code 
Napoleon.  He had provided the strong stable government that many desired. 
 The majority of the assembly’s deputies made no concession to the Napoleonic system in 
the constitution that was slowly taking shape.  The new charter was, however, never to be 
completed.  The confrontation between the assembly’s majority and the emperor became ever 
more intense.  What rendered it irresolvable was the majority’s unwise decision to take on the 
military officers in the Rio garrison.  In November 1823 the troops were marched into the city 
and dissolved the assembly.  Whatever the provocation, and it had been considerable, the 
emperor’s action in authorizing the coup was baleful for his own future as monarch and 
detrimental for the prospects of a regime that combined Monarchy and Liberalism.  In the short 
term Pedro I triumphed.  He defeated a Nativist rising in the Northeast against his rule.  The 
revolt made impossible his promise to summon a new constituent assembly.  Instead the newly 
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appointed Council of State took the constitution left unfinished by the Assembly and produced a 
revised draft that was sent to the town councils for suggestions and approval.  On March 24, 
1824, the new constitution was promulgated, unchanged from the draft presented to the town 
councils. 
 The Constitution which lasted until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1889 was in 
content a profoundly ambiguous, in fact contradictory, document.  In one respect it established a 
fully Liberal political order.  The executive, legislature and judiciary were made separate and 
independent.  There was a long list of citizens’ rights.  The rights of property were declared to be 
absolute with expropriation to be by due process and fully compensated.  The basic franchise 
was extensive although elections were held on a two-tier system, as was the case in France until 
1848.  On the other side, the 1824 Constitution adopted the idea of a fourth power, terming it 
“the key to the entire political organization”, which was “delegated to the Emperor as the 
supreme chief of the nation and its first representative”.3  The monarch was not accountable for 
his use of the regulating power which included, among other attributes, appointing and 
dismissing ministers, naming new members to the life Senate and dissolving the elected chamber 
of deputies.  If the monarch employed these prerogatives judiciously, he could control the 
political system regardless of the popular will. 
 During the remaining seven years of his reign the Emperor Pedro I showed himself to be 
incapable of managing the political system.  His birth in Portugal and his dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly had permanently alienated a good part of the political community while 
his dependence on a limited, mostly Portuguese-born, circle of advisers and his erratic style of 
governing did nothing to win over moderates.  His handling of the legislature, which first met in 
                                                 
3  Articles 98 and 99; see José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, Direito público brasileiro e análise da 
constituição do império 2nd ed. (Rio: Ministério da Justiça, 1958), pp. 483, 492. 
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May 1826, was simply inept.  The deputies devoted their energies to passing laws that 
dismantled the institutions of the colonial period, restricted the authority of the Imperial 
government and wherever possible devolved powers to elected officials.  That Liberalism 
became the hegemonic form of political belief was due in part to the deputies and in part to the 
appearance of a periodical press devoted to the cause.  The conflict between the Emperor and 
deputies intensified when the second Chamber of Deputies convened in May 1830.  The 
confrontation of 1823 was repeated but, when the flashpoint came in April 1831 over the 
Emperor’s right to appoint whom he chose as ministers, the outcome was very different.  Faced 
with a popular insurrection and abandoned by the Rio de Janeiro garrison, Pedro I abdicated in 
favour of his son, then aged five, rather than yield any of his prerogatives under the Constitution.  
The former Emperor departed for Portugal where he died three years later. 
 The events of April 7, 1831 created a vacuum in authority which the Liberals were swift 
to fill.  The first decision they had to make was whether to retain the monarchy or to declare a 
republic.  Given the intensity of the crisis and the need not to alienate moderate opinion, the 
infant Pedro II, left in Rio by his father, was maintained as nominal sovereign.  The 1824 
constitution gave the Chamber of Deputies the right to elect three regents to serve during the 
monarch’s minority and to define their powers.  The deputies withheld from the new regents all 
the prerogatives pertaining to the “regulating power”.  The effect of that decision was to make 
Brazil for the time being a republic.  The legislature enacted laws designed to entrench the new 
Liberal order.  The most significant of these measures was the passage in 1834 of an amendment 
to the constitution that introduced a single regent, popularly elected, abolished the Council of 
State and – most importantly of all – created in the provinces elected assemblies.   To these 
assemblies the Ato Adicional, as it was known, transferred many of the powers of governing.  
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The effect was to implement the Nativist vision of the country.  Brazil changed from a unitary 
nation state into a confederation, a grouping of largely autonomous provinces with the national 
government in charge of foreign relations and the maintenance of internal order.  The president 
of the province continued to be appointed and removable by the national government but he 
played a subordinate role to the new provincial assembly. 
 The most kindly evaluation of this new system of government is that it did not work, the 
most critical that it was a disaster.  The provincial assemblies became the locus for ruthless 
struggles between contending factions for the control of local power.   The struggles weakened 
both the mechanisms for social control and the culture of social deference.  Civil unrest and open 
resistance grew across the country.  A major revolt broke out in the far north, the Cabanagem, 
and a second in the far south, the Farroupilha.  The best the national government could do was to 
contain these uprisings.  It failed to repress them. 
 The consequence was a general reaction against the Nativist vision of the Liberal order.  
It is important to note that the foes of the 1834 reforms did not reject Liberalism as such.  The 
advocates of O Regresso, or “The Return” as it was known, gave priority to the maintenance of 
good order in society and to the protection of established rights, above all that of property.  In 
their own words they favoured uma liberdade bem entendida, “a properly defined liberty”.  The 
supporters of the Regresso gained control of the national government in 1837 and sought to 
suppress the revolts and restore good order and obedience.  These efforts provoked strenuous 
resistance by the Nativist groups entrenched in the provinces.  The sole promising element was 
the slow but inexorable passage through the legislature of a bill introduced in 1837 which, under 
the guise of “interpreting” the provisions of the Ato Adicional, in fact gutted them.  It restored to 
the national government control of the judiciary and of the police.  It would, however, take some 
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years for the new law to be promulgated and enforced and it was not clear that the existing order 
in Brazil would endure that long.  As the British envoy reported in September 1839, “Some of 
my colleagues here, and some persons for whose opinion I have much respect, think that this 
Empire is on the eve of Dissolution, or at least of a crisis, of which the result cannot be but most 
fatal”.4  The Liberal order, engendered between 1808 and 1822, entrenched during the late 1820s 
and dominant after 1831 had reached the end of the road. 
 Let me now turn to the third and probably the most complex and hopefully the most 
distinctive part of this presentation.  In a situation so desperate and threatening as that existing in 
1839 it was understandable that Brazilians looked for a saviour – a person innately superior to 
themselves, someone of uncontested authority and unquestioned legitimacy who would manage 
the existing political system and maintain good order within the framework of the constitution.  
Brazilians had only to look to France, where Louis Philippe had since 1830 ruled in precisely 
this fashion.  The “Citizen King” was, a leading newspaper declared, “a strong monarch who 
curbs the ambitions of the discontented and suppresses the fanaticism of the masses, an able 
monarch who reconciles liberty with order, with internal peace, with the development of the 
country, with its artistic and literary glory”.5  In fact, this vision of the monarch and of his own 
future role was being inculcated into Pedro II then aged ten.  One of the lessons he had to copy 
survives and begins:  “Happy the people who are ruled by a prudent prince.  They live content, 
prosperous, and love the man to whom they owe their good fortune”.  “Love your peoples as 
                                                 
4  National Archives, Kew, Foreign Office 13/154, William Gore Ouseley, British minister, to 
Viscount Palmerston, Foreign Minister, no. 71, Rio, September 18, 1839. 
5  O Chronista June 21, 1838.   The article was probably written by Justiniano José da Rocha. 
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your children and acquire the knowledge to be loved by them”.6  Without much or any 
justification, Brazilians perceived Pedro II as already possessing the very qualities they most 
desired in a citizen monarch. 
 The flaw in this perception was that when the Emperor celebrated his birthday on 
December 2, 1839, he was only fourteen years old.  By the terms of the Constitution he would 
not be of age and assume full powers as monarch until 1843, four years thence.  Understandably 
the exigencies Brazilians faced meant that pressure grew for Pedro II to be declared of age at 
once.  As early as July 1839 the British envoy reported, “From the best sources of information, I 
am almost led to think that the Minority of the Emperor will not, under any circumstances, last 
beyond the year 1841, if it last so long”.7  His prognostication proved correct.  A short and swift 
campaign achieved that goal in July 1840. 
 What is surprising is not the swift success of the campaign but the reality that its principal 
organizers were politicians identified with Nativist Liberalism.  A longing for political stability 
may in part explain their willingness to violate the Constitution.  More probably their action 
reflected their fear that, with the law interpreting the Ato Adicional finally passed in May 1840, 
only an immediate majority would prevent their exclusion from power for the foreseeable future.  
In fact two Nativist Liberals were included in the first cabinet appointed by the young Emperor.  
The sacrifice of principle for profit rapidly turned sour.  After a few months in office the cabinet 
was dismissed to be replaced by a ministry which systematically purged the adepts of Nativist 
                                                 
6
  Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro CI Caixa 9 Pacote 3 Documento 127.  The exercise is signed: 
D. Pedro 2°, São Cristóvão, 22 Setembro 1836. 
7
  National Archives, Kew, Foreign Office 13/154, William Gore Ouseley, British minister, to 
Viscount Palmerston, Foreign Minister, no. 56, Confidential, Rio, July 20, 1839. 
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Liberalism from their existing posts in the lower judiciary and the police.  There followed the 
1842 revolt in São Paulo and Minas Gerais, the two provinces most identified with Nativism.  
Easily suppressed, the revolt acted as the catalyst for the emergence of formal political parties.  
The supporters of the sitting cabinet organized its supporters into what was first known as “the 
party of order” and later as the Conservative party.  Early in 1844 the Conservatives, having 
offended the young emperor by trespassing on his prerogatives, found themselves in turn 
dismissed from office.  They were replaced by a new cabinet that used all the means of coercion 
and enticement available to it to enrol the Conservatives’ opponents into a Liberal party and to 
win the ensuing elections to the Chamber of Deputies. 
 I have gone into this detail to make two points.  First, no profound ideological 
convictions divided the two political parties.  They are best viewed as national coalitions of 
provincial factions based on family clans competing for dominance at the local level.  On the 
critical issue of slavery and the African slave trade, for example, both parties contained 
supporters of the African trade, banned by law since 1831 but never suppressed, and of the slave 
system.  Contrary to what might be expected, however, it was the Conservatives, not the 
Liberals, who in 1850-51 finally suppressed the illicit slave trade.  On the other hand, those of 
Republican belief or Republican sympathies were to be found only in the Liberal Party but in 
such politicians an appetite for influence and office took precedence over those beliefs.  On my 
second point, it was the Emperor’s actions as holder of the regulating power that brought the two 
parties into existence.  It was his grant of a dissolution to the sitting cabinet in 1842 that had 
triggered the ensuing Nativist revolt and enabled the new Conservative party to fix the ensuing 
elections.  Similarly it was his grant in 1844 of a dissolution to the cabinet replacing the 
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Conservative ministry that brought the new Liberal party into being and secured it a majority in 
the new Chamber. 
 If Pedro II’s use of his prerogatives as holder of the regulating power in 1842 and 1844 
indicated a certain highhandedness and lack of political judgment, the faults can be largely 
ascribed to his immaturity.  A long visit in 1845 to the far south, where the Farroupilha revolt 
had just ended, transformed Pedro II as ruler.  As a contemporary described the emperor during 
the visit, “he is affable with everyone, speaks to anyone, asks questions, and tries to be informed 
about the smallest things.  He has gone about on foot like a simple citizen, accompanied only by 
those who want to be with him with no ceremony whatsoever”.8  These comments explain the 
emperor’s success as ruler.  His restraint, invariable courtesy and fair-mindedness kept 
discontent at a minimum.  His eschewal of the visible trappings of power and privilege made him 
appear to be ideal “citizen” in the Liberal mould.  Indeed, such was exactly how he perceived his 
role.  In October 1862, when considering the possibility that he might be dethroned, he wrote in 
his diary “I will never flinch from fulfilling my duties as a Brazilian citizen”.9  As a citizen 
should be, he was grave, cultured and devoted to the public well being, the protection of personal 
liberties and the advancement of Brazil’s interests.  By the 1850s he had acquired a reputation in 
Europe as the model constitutional monarch, a reputation that enhanced his standing in Brazilian 
eyes. 
 While not remarkable in terms of intellect, the emperor possessed energy, iron 
determination and marked political skills.  He was adept at managing affairs, so that during the 
                                                 
8
  José Antônio Saraiva to Henrique Garcez Pinto de Madureira, São Paulo, Mar. 4, 1846, cited in 
José Wanderley [de Araújo] Pinho, Politica e politicos no imperio:  contribuições documentaes.  
(Rio: Imprensa Nacional, 1930), pp. 25-26. 
9  Entry for October 17, 1862, in H. Vianna, ed., “Diário de 1862,” Anuário do Museu Imperial 
xvii (1955): 233. 
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1850s politics functioned smoothly and seemingly of their own accord.  The leading politicians 
and the ruling circles in general wished above all to avoid a repetition of the traumatic 
experience of the 1830s.  They accepted the emperor as supreme arbiter.  They avoided 
confrontations with Pedro II and the dread that he might employ against them and their party his 
prerogatives under the regulating power kept them deferential and subordinate.  What also made 
possible this stability was Brazil’s prosperity and growth including the railroad introduced during 
the 1850s, driven by in good part by the boom in coffee production. 
 The very successes of the era created its own problems.  As memories of the troubled 
1830s faded and as a new political generation reached maturity, faith in Liberalism revived along 
with a longing for provincial autonomy and a preference for a Republic.  Expectations that the 
political, economic and social advances occurring in Europe would be matched in Brazil were 
not fulfilled and so fed discontents.  The supporters of a revived Liberalism proved, however, 
unable to outmanoeuvre the emperor, take power and enact structural changes.  The Liberals’ 
aggressive nationalism contributed to the outbreak in 1864 of war with Paraguay.  The conflict 
led to the suspension of all internal reforms.  Pedro II’s determination to secure total victory in 
the war led him in July 1868 to an overt use of the regulating power.   He replaced the sitting 
Liberal cabinet with a Conservative ministry and granted to the new cabinet a dissolution of the 
chamber of deputies.  That election, which returned only Conservatives, revealed the utter falsity 
of the electoral system and demonstrated the Emperor’s ability to manipulate the political system 
as he pleased.  The founding in 1870 of a Republican Party was a warning signal that constituted 
no immediate threat to the regime but it did mark both the era of post-legitimacy for the 
monarchy and the end of Liberalism. 
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 Let me begin the fourth and final part of this presentation by analyzing the causes for the 
decline of the Monarchy.  Victory in the Paraguayan war which lasted from 1864 to 1870 
required the unprecedented mobilization of both men and resources.  The conflict acted, in Pedro 
II’s own words, as “a powerful electric shock to nationhood”.10  Men from all parts of Brazil 
who served together for long periods at the war front no longer thought in terms of a conjoined 
monarch and pátria.  The pátria, by now identified with the nation, sufficed, making the 
monarch unnecessary, a relic of the past.  In respect to resources, the war spurred considerable 
growth in the Brazilian economy, requiring in turn an expansion in the structures of government.  
Pedro II’s style of ruling, involving personal oversight and control of every facet of 
administration, became stultifying and self-defeating.  He himself, now in middle age, became 
outdated in his dress, manners, outlook and expectations.  The gender and lack of political skills 
of the Emperor’s heir, Princess Isabel, deprived her of credibility as his successor.  By the 1880s 
the regime had lost all momentum, surviving simply because it was there.  It was, oddly enough, 
one final upsurge of Liberalism, the Abolitionist movement, bringing slavery to an end in May 
1888, which sealed the monarchy’s fate. 
 The decline and fall of Liberalism in Brazil can be traced to several causes, external and 
internal.  In respect to external influences, the death of John Stuart Mill in 1873 symbolized the 
supersession of classical Liberalism by the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer in England and 
by the secular Positivism of Emile Littré in France.  Herbert Spencer in particular presented an 
all encompassing philosophy of existence that acquired hegemonic standing.  It explained and 
                                                 
10  Pedro II to the Condessa de Barral, Rio de Janeiro, February 7, 1866, in Raymundo Magalhães 
Jr., ed., D. Pedro II e a condessa de Barral … (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, [1956]), p. 
68. 
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justified the changes being wrought by the second industrial revolution – the extremes of wealth 
and poverty, the inevitability of rapid technological and economic change, the necessity of rule 
by an enlightened minority.  Educated Brazilians were very much aware of these developments.  
The transatlantic cable opened in 1874 brought news immediately from the outside world while 
advances in marine engineering multiplied the steamship lines that took Brazilians to Europe and 
to North America and brought foreigners to Brazil in growing numbers. 
 What made Social Darwinism and secular Positivism so attractive to the ruling circles in 
Brazil was that the new doctrines allowed them to abandon those aspects of Liberalism which 
threatened to undermine their dominance of the political system.  A key aspect of Liberalism, as 
stressed in the first part of this presentation, was the citizen whom Liberalism defined as the 
literate, cultured, politically conscious and active male, gainfully employed and owning property.  
As the second part showed, originally few Brazilians met the criteria of citizenship.  The mass of 
the population remained subordinate and excluded.  By the 1870s, however, literacy and its 
concomitant culture expanded among the urban male population, a popular press spread political 
consciousness, and increasing numbers held gainful employment.  What this social stratum 
desired principally was a reform of the electoral system that would, through an end to the 
existing two-tier voting system, give full and free participation in the political process.  The 
Electoral Reform law of January 1881 did indeed abolish the two-tier voting system and enact 
measures to prevent electoral fraud.  The law also defined the franchise so narrowly as to 
exclude from the electorate the overwhelming majority of those who, by the standards of 
Liberalism, did qualify as citizens.  It was a Liberal cabinet, not a Conservative ministry,  that 
introduced and passed this measure. 
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 If the 1881 law could and did deprive many Brazilian males of their right to vote, it could 
not and did not deprive those excluded of their political consciousness and their determination to 
achieve structural change in their country.  It was the excluded who provided the mass support 
that made viable the campaign to abolish slavery.  That campaign dominated politics during the 
1880s.  The Golden Law of May 13, 1888, was a final and triumphant expression of Liberalism 
in Imperial Brazil.  Abolition asserted the supremacy of the individual right to freedom over 
property rights.  Freedom for slaves was, however, a negative act that did not, contrary to what 
Abolitionists promised and anticipated, serve as the catalyst for transforming social, economic 
and cultural structures in Brazil.  No such radical reforms followed on the Golden Law which 
had distanced the plantation owners from the regime.  The army coup overthrowing the Empire 
on November 15, 1889, marked the end of Liberalism in Brazil.  The new regime was meant to 
achieve the reforms that the Empire could not accomplish but such expectations quickly 
vanished.  The Old Republic, itself overthrown in 1930, displayed most of the faults of the 
Empire and few of its virtues. 
 In conclusion, let me briefly remind you why I entitled this presentation, “The Enigma of 
Liberalism in Imperial Brazil, 1822-1889”. The social, economic and cultural conditions in 
Brazil at the start of the nineteenth century were not conducive to the establishment of 
Liberalism as the dominant political creed.  The existence of a double loyalty to and 
identification with monarch and pátria meant that Liberalism could not triumph during the 
independence era in the absence of Monarchy.  The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 
1823 revealed the incompatibilities between Monarchy and Liberalism.  However, the traumas of 
the 1830s demonstrated the inability of Liberalism on its own to maintain order and to give 
prosperity to Brazil and so forced the political community to turn to the monarch as 
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indispensable if Liberalism were to survive.  It was the political skills of Pedro II, the citizen 
emperor par excellence, which made Brazil during the middle decades of the nineteenth century 
the epitome of the Liberal state in Latin America.  Yet it was the emperor’s control of the 
political process that thwarted the structural changes necessary for the regime to flourish and for 
Brazil to develop.  Lastly, when the Empire and Liberalism ceased to serve the interests of the 
ruling circles, both were jettisoned in favour of a republican regime that, as time was to show, 
proved not one whit more suited to Brazil’s needs. 
